Why Immigration Policy Should Be a Federal Policy: Considerations on the EU and the US by Giordani, Paolo & Ruta, Michele
 Except  where otherwise noted content on this site is licensed under a Creative Commons 2.5 Italy License                   N -   
 
26 
ISSN: 2036-5438 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Why Immigration Policy Should Be a Federal Policy: 
Considerations on the EU and the US 
by 
Paolo Giordani and Michele RutaI 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Perspectives on Federalism, Vol. 3, issue 1, 2011 
 Except  where otherwise noted content on this site is licensed under a Creative Commons 2.5 Italy License                   N -   
 
27 
 
 
Abstract 
 
In a union of states such as the EU or the US, should immigration policy be 
decentralized or should it be a federal policy? Experience and economic logic offer a 
simple argument against decentralization. Because immigration reforms in one state are felt 
beyond its borders, other states will respond in kind. Decentralization will, therefore, create 
coordination problems between states and will reduce their individual and collective ability 
to manage immigration.  In the EU and the US, the existence of a federal policy is a 
precondition for an effective management of migratory flows  
 
Key-words:  
 
Immigration Policy, Decentralization, Coordination Failures  
 Except  where otherwise noted content on this site is licensed under a Creative Commons 2.5 Italy License                   N -   
 
28 
 
 
In the immigration policy debate the contradiction between the long-run interests 
of societies and the short-run incentives of politicians is striking. This is visible on both 
sides of the Atlantic. Policy-makers in the EU member states and in the states of the US 
appear irresistibly attracted to unilateral immigration measures. "Decentralize immigration 
policy!" seems to be the new mantra. Whatever the reasons that motivate this new trend, 
succumbing to these temptations would be wrong. 
 Immigration in the EU is in principle a common policy. According to Article 63a(1) 
of the Lisbon Treaty, "The Union shall develop a common immigration policy aimed at 
ensuring, at all stages, the efficient management of migration flows, fair treatment of third-
country nationals residing legally in Member States, and the prevention of, and enhanced 
measures to combat, illegal immigration and trafficking in human beings." The response to 
the immigration shock caused by the turmoil in the Arab world, however, poorly reflects 
the spirit of the textII. The Council Conclusions on April 12 did not go beyond general 
statements in support of co-operation. This in a context where member states are reluctant 
to provide the central authorities the resources for an effective common policy and some 
leading politicians openly call for unilateral actions and question the wisdom of a single EU 
policy. 
In the US the debate has surprisingly similar elements. The law passed in Arizona in 
April 2010 required local police to detain suspected illegal immigrants and proposed to 
make it a state crime not to carry immigration papers. Aside from having an alarming 
discriminatory nature (President Obama argued that the law risks "to undermine basic 
notions of fairness that we cherish as Americans"III), the Arizona reform shifted important 
responsibilities on immigration matters back to the state level. In July 2010 a federal judge 
in Phoenix blocked the Arizona law, a decision that has been upheld this week by a Court 
of Appeals. However, several other US states are considering similar reforms.  
State policy-makers in the EU and in the US should ask themselves if unilateral 
immigration measures are in the long-run interests of the societies they represent. Will the 
decentralization of immigration policy (that is, the move away from central authorities to 
state intervention) improve the control over immigration? Experience and simple 
economic logic offer a clear and negative answer to this question. Because immigration 
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reforms in one state are felt beyond its borders, other states will respond in kind. 
Decentralization will, therefore, create coordination problems between states and will 
reduce their individual and collective ability to manage immigration.   
Data on international migration show that migrants (legal or not) choose their 
destination in response, among other things, to differences in policies in host economies. 
In their historical account of migratory flows and immigration policy, Professors Hatton 
and Williamson find that receiving countries paid close attention to each other's policies as 
migrants were pulled from and pushed toward one country in response to less or more 
restrictive policies in others. (Hatton and Williamson, 2005). For instance, in the late 19th 
and early 20th century Australia's open immigration policy decreased flows to Canada, 
while Argentina saw an influx of migrants as the United States closed its doors. It will not 
come as a surprise that something that was true over a century ago for loosely 
interconnected countries is highly magnified at present times within a union of states.  
A first well-documented example is provided by recent European history. In 
January 2004, the European Union incorporated ten new member states from Eastern and 
Central Europe. Transitional arrangements allowed individual EU states to postpone for a 
transitional period their complete implementation of  the principle of free movement of 
people inside the Union and to impose temporary restrictions on immigration from the 
new members. As shown by Boeri and Bruecker (2004), these varying  arrangements 
affected the geographical orientation of migrants from Eastern and Central Europe (Boeri 
and Bruecker, 2005). Specifically, different unilateral measures resulted in substantial 
diversion of migration flows from states with tougher rules to states with more open rules.  
A second example is provided by the consequences in the US of the passing of the 
Arizona immigration law. Even though its central provisions had been suspended, in the 
shadow of legal ambiguity the effects on migratory decisions started to materialize. In 
November 2010, The Economist reported a study of BBVA Bancomer, a Mexican Bank. 
Researchers estimated that around 100,000 Hispanics, both legal and illegal, are leaving 
Arizona for other destinations in response to the adoption of the law.IV Some immigrants 
return to Mexico, many find their way to other states of the US.  
The mobility of migrants across different jurisdictions makes immigration policy 
choices interdependent. This interdependence is stronger for host economies that are 
closely interconnected, as is the case for the states of the US and the members of the EU. 
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Specifically, the choice of one state will inevitably affect others through the location 
decisions of migrants.  In this environment, individual states will easily mismanage 
immigration as unilateral decisions will trigger reactions of other state governments.  
In a recent paper (Giordani and Ruta, 2011), we show that the decentralization of 
immigration policy may lead to what economists refer to as “coordination failures” - a 
situation where policy choices are driven by beliefs rather than fundamentals and are 
associated with a lower social welfare. (Giordani and Ruta, 2011). These coordination 
failures are likely to emerge when state policy-makers are uncertain about the immigration 
reforms of other states. For instance, fears that other states will be tougher on migrants will 
trigger an unnecessary escalation in restrictions as governments set up barriers to avoid 
possible sudden influx of migrants. In brief, properly controlling immigration is a powerful 
argument for a single policy on this matter in a union of states. 
There are many open and difficult questions related to the management of the 
flows of migrants in receiving economies, but there is something that we know in any case: 
The end result of decentralization of immigration policy in a union of states, such as the 
EU or the US, will be an increased inability to address the challenges presented by 
immigration. This is not in the long-run interest of proponents of unilateral state 
interventions and - what matters more - of the people they represent.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
                                                 
I Paolo Giordani is an assistant professor of economics at Luiss University in Rome, Michele Ruta is an 
economist in the Research Department of the WTO. The opinions expressed in this article are personal and 
should be attributed to the authors only. 
II The recent influx of migrants has also prompted a debate on the reform of the Schengen Treaty which 
allows the free mobility of people across signatory states in Europe. For a critical assessment of this proposal, 
see Tito Boeri, 2011  
IIIThe speech is available online at the following address: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/remarks-president-comprehensive-immigration-reform 
IVThe study can be accessed online at the following address: 
 http://www.bbvaresearch.com/KETD/fbin/mult/101025_PresentationsMexico_66_eng_tcm348-
234645.pdf 
 
 
References 
 
• Boeri, Tito and Bruecker Herbert, 2005, ‘Why are European getting so tough on migrants?’, 
Economic Policy, 44: 629-704. 
• Boeri Tito, 2011, ‘Reforming Schengen is the wrong response to the Lampedusa crisis’, available at: 
http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/6438  
 Except  where otherwise noted content on this site is licensed under a Creative Commons 2.5 Italy License                   N -   
 
31 
                                                                                                                                               
• Giordani Paolo and Ruta Michele, 2011, ‘Coordination Failures in Immigration Policy’, WTO 
Working Paper, No. 2-2011. The article is accessible electronically at: 
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/reser_e/ersd201102_e.pdf 
Hatton, Timothy .J. and Jeffrey G. Williamson, 2005, ‘Global Migration and the World Economy: 
Two Centuries of Policy and Performance’, Cambridge, The MIT press. 
 
